If war is God’s way of teaching Americans geography, is terrorism God’s way of teaching Americans psychology?

Chris Rose

Campaign strategists of different stripes have long learnt from one another. The ancient Chinese Art of War by Sun Tzu remains probably the greatest book on pure strategy. The Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz wrote: “rather than comparing [war] to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale.” This is often paraphrased as ‘business is war by another means’. In concepts, theories and in practice, the boundaries between social cause campaigns, business, advertising and marketing campaigns, political campaigns and military campaigns, are fluid and when not fluid, porous.

In 2005 this Newsletter [1] argued that George Bush and Tony Blair were mistaking the use of military force in the ‘War on Terror’ for a Level 3 Strategy (one which could actually be made to work) when it was in reality merely Level 2: one which, if it did work, would solve the problem. It pointed to psychological evidence of the drivers for terrorism and proposed a ‘Mother of All Campaigns’ to deflect tacit support from terrorism through giving hope of alternative agency through political processes. Now the failure of force in the ‘War on Terror’ is so widely acknowledged that even US Generals question it.

Is there anything to be learnt then, from the US Military’s ‘new strategy’ in Afghanistan, either in terms of strategy or implications?

On 31 August 2009 US Lt-General Stanley McChrystal was reported by the BBC [2] as being about to say that the current military strategy in Afghanistan is ‘not working’, and rather than more troops, ‘protecting the Afghan people against the Taliban must be the top priority’. The aim should be ‘for Afghan forces to take the lead but their army will not be ready to do that for three years and it will take much longer for the police’. More interestingly, General McChrystal also wanted ‘more engagement with the Taliban fighters and he believes that 60% of the problem would go away if they could be found jobs’.

War by Socio-Economic Development

Jobs? What is this war or war by socio-economic development? McChrystal’s comments are no throw away remark but are in line with the ‘new’ doctrine of ‘Counterinsurgency’ promoted by his boss, US General David Petraeus, the driving force behind The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, or FM3-24 (available at www.amazon.com and online[3]).

There is now a large and complicated debate going on in American political and military circles about ‘COIN’ or ‘Counterinsurgency’ strategy stimulated not least, by the obvious failure to achieve war aims in Iraq and Afghanistan by the use of force alone, and the associated failure to ‘defeat terrorism’. It’s a debate that all campaigners should take a look at.

Petraeus has attracted praise and criticism for his use of the Iraq ‘surge’ (2007-8) to reduce fighting between Sunnis and Shias by putting many more ‘boots on the ground’ and allowing (and financing) communities to carry out their own security, including walled areas and paid ‘security guards’. Although there is much disagreement about whether this strategy really is ‘new’ or quite what the aims and objectives, actions and outcomes were, the common ground between FM3-24, the surge
campaign and the noises now coming from McChrystal and others over Afghanistan, is the need to establish security and make people feel safe.

This, it is argued, is a necessary prior step before you can begin to alienate or marginalise ‘terrorist’ groups on the one hand, or engage in ‘reconstruction’ and sustainable nation (re)building on the other. Australian David McKillen, adviser to Petraeus and McChrystal defines [4] the shift as from "enemy-centric" warfare (in which you simply aim to find and kill the enemy) to "population-centric", in which you need to engage and persuade the population (in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, persuade them to reject Al Qaeda).

Under this form of COIN, warfare and governance begin to merge. In the wake of McChrystal’s announcement The Guardian reported [5]:

‘Afghanistan’s government must fight corruption and deliver services to Afghans quickly, because Taliban militants were filling gaps and winning support. The Taliban were already running courts, hospitals and even an ombudsman in parallel to the government, making a real difference to local people, said David Kilcullen, a senior adviser to McChrystal’.

“'A government that is losing to a counter-insurgency isn't being outfought, it is being out-governed. And that's what's happening in Afghanistan,” Kilcullen told Australia's National Press Club.’

In Kilcullen’s version of counter-insurgency then, the military and its allies are in a competition with others to win over the population. Clearly this has more to do with campaigns and communications than artillery. In situations like Afghanistan Kilcullen argues there are ‘accidental guerillas’ (the title of his book), who are not motivated by ‘bigger picture’ or doctrinaire disputes or ideology (as are for example Al Qaeda) but by defence of their territory, identity or local grievances. To put it it simplistic terms, he argues that these people are the great majority of the ‘Taliban’ that America and its allies are currently fighting. He asserts that with a different strategy, they could be induced not to fight alongside the Al Qaeda elements who have recruited them. From this it follows that America and its allies should be pursuing tactics and strategies to give these ‘accidental guerillas’ a better deal than Al Qaeda. In turn, this means starting not so much from an analysis of the disposition of forces but from psychology, interests and motivation. In this way, the ‘new’ COIN leads the military into very similar areas to other campaigns.

In a March 2006 paper entitled ‘Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency’ [6] written as if to a company commander about to deploy to Afghanistan, Kilcullen states:

*If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: this is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything weaker than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people and societal disruption that fuels and perpetuates the insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. For your side to win, the people do not have to like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security. In this battlefield popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than a hundred tanks.*
So isn’t this just what other armies like the British, learnt the hard way in Northern Ireland and in other ‘asymmetrical’ conflicts, and what the wiser imperial rulers have always known? Well to a point but if the Kilcullen recipe were to be followed through, the Americans could end up going considerably further. And for the US military-political mind, for so long framed by the exercise of mastery through might, this is a revolutionary change, and perhaps one therefore being bitterly resisted.

If not old knowledge, isn’t it just a formula for old fashioned propaganda alongside bombing and shooting? I don’t think so. The difference is that conventional war-time propaganda (in any case often mainly aimed at one’s own population although ostensibly addressed to the enemy) sought to justify, to intimidate and sap the will of the enemy to fight. For ‘our side’ it created a version of the enemy who was to be feared and could justifiably be annihilated with no moral or ethical qualms.

In this case, Kilcullen is arguing that the motivations of the opposition must be understood, and then, that where possible the needs behind these motivations should be met. As Abraham Maslow pointed out, a need met is no longer a need. Kilcullen is reasoning that if that need was the reason for fighting, this will be a more effective, perhaps the only, effective way of causing someone to stop fighting.

Kilcullen’s second ‘Article’ includes this:

.. you must understand what motivates the people and how to mobilize them. You need to know why and how the insurgents are getting followers. This means you need to know your real enemy, not a cardboard cut-out. The enemy is adaptive, resourceful and probably grew up in the region where you will operate. The locals have known him since he was a boy. How long have they known you? Your worst opponent is not the psychopathic terrorist of Hollywood, it is the charismatic follow-me warrior who would make your best platoon leader. His followers are not misled or naïve: much of his success is due to bad government policies or security forces that alienate the population.

Strip out the elements of force and many of Kilcullen’s 28 Articles - he calls them ‘folklore’ - while not quite a modern version of the Art of War, are worth reading for any campaigner. Many campaigns fail because the opponent is not understood, and his supporters are not recruited, often because the campaign makes no serious attempt to do so. Kilcullen’s 23rd Article is explicit about ‘civil affairs’ as a weapon:

Practise armed civil affairs. Counterinsurgency is armed social work; an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes civil affairs a central counterinsurgency activity, not an afterthought. It is how you restructure the environment to displace the enemy from it. In your company sector, civil affairs must focus on meeting basic needs first, then progress up Maslow’s hierarchy as each successive need is met.

A series of village or neighborhood surveys, regularly updated, are an invaluable tool to help understand the population’s needs, and track progress in meeting them over time. You need intimate cooperation with inter-agency partners here: national, international and local. You will not be able to control these partners. Many NGOs, for example, do not want to be too closely associated with you because they need to preserve their perceived neutrality. Instead, you need to work on a shared diagnosis of the problem, building a consensus that helps you self-synchronize. Your role is to provide protection, identify needs, facilitate civil affairs and use improvements in social conditions as leverage to build networks and mobilize the population. Thus, there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency.
Every time you help someone, you hurt someone else. Not least the insurgents. So civil and humanitarian assistance personnel will be targeted. Protecting them is a matter not only of close-in defense, but also of creating a permissive operating environment by coopting the beneficiaries of aid - local communities and leaders - to help you help them.

It’s easy to see why this is a massively controversial area between the military, and reconstruction, development, humanitarian and relief workers. It’s not an area I want to explore now. Instead let’s look at values.

Maslow Goes To War

Maslow’s Hierarchy [7] says that the first needs are physiological like air, food and water. Next comes safety and security. Then identity and belonging. These are all known as ‘survival’, ‘sustenance’ or ‘security’ needs, and as readers of this Newsletter will know, in a country like Afghanistan, experiencing chronic insecurity from things like disease and food shortages, most people remain Security-Driven all their life.

Clearly, if an army comes along, invades a country, threatens life and destroys infrastructure and the normal means of existence, it is not meeting these needs but making the experience worse. A good reason to fight.

At the same time, if you still have enough food, air and water but find your identity or sense of belonging is threatened, that may be another good reason to fight. This of course is the conventional warfare threat in a nation-nation conflict, such as Britain facing Nazi Germany in World War 2, or a host of identity conflicts based on ethnicity or religion.

In Iraq in 2006-8, Petraeus apparently took a leaf from Kilcullen’s book, and amidst much criticism [8] achieved reductions in Sunni-Shia casualties by increasing the sense of security of the two warring communities. Petraeus increased safety and confidence in Baghdad by using the ‘surge’ in troop numbers to put ‘boots on the ground’ and try to win local support by getting US troops out of their barracks and into the streets to improve security for local people. In some areas he also gave the ‘ok’ for local ‘tribes’ to use their own weapons to defend their areas against Al Qaeda, and in Baghdad, enabled communities in Sunni and Shia areas to improve their sense of security, identity and belonging by maintaining walls to keep others out. Of course he did not bring about a return to Sunni and Shia integration in some areas that had once been harmoniously mixed but he did reduce sectarian killings.

Petraeus did better than almost anyone had expected. By the end of 2008 he was widely praised and the UK Sunday Telegraph even made him ‘Person of the Year’ [9]. What happened afterwards is another issue, and probably nobody would argue that if it was an example of a strategy based on trying to meet psychological needs, it was anything but a highly flawed first start. But the fact that it is being tried at all is surely interesting.

This then is probably what McChrystal means by 60% of ‘the problem’ being soluble if people had jobs. Having a job can be part of someone’s identity but it can also give esteem - which in Iraq would have been even more important than Afghanistan, as Iraq is a more developed country with a bigger ‘middle class’ and more Esteem Driven ‘Prospectors’. So if the immediate security situation were to improve in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, you want to help people find ways to acquire or recover the esteem of others or self esteem. Creating institutions, rebuilding bureaucracies and allowing businesses and professions to flourish, enabling people to meet and socialize and enjoy themselves, and get jobs, are all ways which would help meet the needs of the ‘Esteem Driven’. The
much publicized re-activation of the Iraq national football team would have helped make many Prospectors and Settlers happier.

Is This Ethical?

By now, any reader who is a Concerned Ethical, that segment of Inner Directed Pioneers which CDSM maps [10], who are constantly looking for ethical clarity and ethical action, may have condemned me for failing to question the ethics or morality of what Kilcullen and others are doing. Is it right for any academic discipline or profession to help make a military-political-operation more effective? It’s an issue for example among anthropologists [11].

On balance it seems to me that if the US Military, the most powerful single force in the world, and even more, if the US political system, were to start seriously considering the implications of Maslowian needs, it would be a good thing. The most likely way for this to happen may be for the military to internalise it in their procedures, for all large institutions tend to be rather impervious to external ideas.

Why is it good? First, it forces you to mentally humanize the population of any country, including ‘the enemy’. No longer can they look like aliens or ideological automatons or whatever other convenient categories we might use to dehumanize them and so make them easier to kill, for we are thinking about their needs and motivations in terms we can recognize as fundamental and also applying to ourselves.

Second, it is better than what the US has been doing ‘up until now’ (and yes, it’s a mixed picture). In Newsletter 15, back in 2005, I noted that: ‘After 9/11, the Americans launched a renewed global PR effort for capitalism and their ‘way of life’, spear-headed by Charlotte Beers, former brand manager for Uncle Ben’s Rice’. That was a propaganda effort, a crude attempt to justify what America did on the grounds that it was ‘better’: persuasion by assertion, not deeds. As writer Nancy Snow, a critic of American foreign policy, noted in her book Propaganda Inc: ‘What the United States does in the world, in practice and policy, will continue to speak louder than any words’. Kilcullen’s meet-the-needs tactic at least means a focus on doing, and on understanding local cultures, rather than simply PR propaganda coupled to overwhelming firepower.

Third, if Kilcullen’s tactic becomes a strategy, it leads to a bigger picture, one in which conventional military power is even more clearly irrelevant: the question of democracy and its struggle with ‘terrorism’. Here we have a huge reservoir of evidence to call upon, in the shape of the work of Ron Inglehart and his collaborators in the World Values Surveys [12].

Inglehart and Democracy

On the concluding three hundredth page of their compendious international study of values and politics Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy [13], Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel write that: “there is widespread evidence that democracies almost never fight other democracies”. The interesting question is why?

Most of the preceding 300 pages is taken up with a painstaking analysis of evidence which shows that for effective democracy to emerge and flourish, societies need a sufficiently large number of people to hold what they term “self-expression values”. Inglehart maps two axes of values: Survival - Self-Expression, and Traditional - Secular-Rational [14].
By ‘Self-Expression’ values Inglehart broadly means not Security Driven needs or what he calls ‘Survival Needs’. Inglehart’s methodology creates a scale from Security Driven to Inner Directed needs (Survival - Self-Expression) but it doesn’t clearly separate the Esteem Driven part of the population in the way they are mapped for example in the more fine-tuned and dynamic CDSM model [15], or in the model of Shalom Schwartz [16], so for communications and campaign purposes it is less useful. In effect they are measuring a subset of the values identified by Maslow and more finely mapped by CDSM and others, with an emphasis on ‘civic’ topics. However, although he hardly mentions Maslow by name, Inglehart produces compelling evidence of how meeting Maslowian needs is a crucial precursor to achieving real democracy. His 2005 analysis could scarcely be more relevant to the current situation in Afghanistan, and any new political strategy which is produced to replace the failed ‘War on Terror’.

**Inglehart’s Analysis Of Democracy and Terrorism**

Let me try and summarise parts of Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: apologies to Professors Inglehart and Welzel for producing a dumbed down version of their work.

Inglehart and Welzel’s studies draw on data from surveys of 200 nation-level cases with more than 250,000 individual level cases, carried out over decades and involving the extensive testing of hypotheses about how social change would affect values and democracy.

From a huge body of evidence they conclude that socio-economic development brings an increased sense of safety and security, which leads to a decline in (that is fewer people hold them) ‘Traditional values’, including dogmatic religion. This is broadly achieved by the effects of industrialisation (material wealth, medicines, sanitation, electricity, independence from the vagaries of the weather etc), and, this causes a rise in ‘Secular-Rational’ values. God is less needed as a causal explanation of what cannot be controlled. They produce evidence that this relationship exists in relation for example, to per capita GNP.

This in itself however does not produce democracy. What sets nations on the course to democracy is the rise of ‘Self-Expression values’ which in turn are brought about by people thinking and acting more for themselves, and that has occurred in ‘post industrial’ societies, through the influences of education, the rise of the ‘creative classes’ doing more autonomous jobs (ie not tied to machines and roles in mass production), and other things such as mass media and globalisation. For example they say: ‘the industrial stage of modernization brings the secularization of authority, whereas the post-industrial stage bring emancipation from authority’. (p 25)

Some countries can become materially rich (Inglehart and Welzel cite the UAE) without a rise in self-expression values, because for example, government has not encouraged policies on education and commerce in ways which ‘encourage individualisation and the experience of autonomy’. This experience, they say, ‘arises from the destandardization and diversification of economic activities, social roles, and human interactions’. They also point out that some past pre-industrial societies probably engendered high levels of self-expression values because they met survival needs, and, encouraged autonomy (eg rainfall-agriculture free-farmer systems), and note (p 291):

‘Ten centuries ago, Islamic societies provided greater leeway for religious, artistic and economic freedom than did contemporary Christian societies, which were then characterized by extreme conformity pressures and the Inquisition. This disparity lasted until the Renaissance, when economic prosperity brought intellectual freedom, a humanistic ethos, and political representation in the urban centres of the Netherlands and northern Italy’.
Once self-expression values reach a critical level - Inglehart and Welzel say about 45% - democracy seems to become almost ‘inevitable’. This is partly because elites within authority structures like the Army or a ruling party (Iran?) themselves acquire these values as generations change, and so will no longer repress freedoms, if they were doing so. As a consequence, there may be ‘velvet revolutions’ or incremental loosening of the hold of oligarchies and dictatorships. Based on values measurements, Inglehart and Welzel say of China (p 191):

‘we predict that China’s socioeconomic liberalisation process and its experimentation with local-level democracy will spill over to the national level so that China will make a transition to a liberal democracy within the next two decades’

The sheer volume of analysis assembled in Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy should make it hard for any decision-maker concerned with evidence-based policy, to ignore. Inglehart and Welzel show for example that factors such as ‘years under democratic government, per capita value of exports, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, income inequality, years of schooling, government expenditure on welfare minus arms, and percentage of Protestants minus Moslems’ - all are cited as causal in various democracy theories - in fact have less effect in terms of predicting whether a country achieves effective democracy than the rise of Self-Expression values.

Inglehart and Welzel note that: ‘There is a ‘pervasive tendency for existential [17] insecurity to produce intolerance and xenophobia’ (p 128). In other words, the Security Driven Settlers in CDSM’s model, or, tend to be less tolerant and more fearful of ‘other’ and more willing to see foreigners as a threat, as borne out in the ‘foreigner’ question in the CDSM model (Settlers agree most that there are “too many foreigners in the country”).

Inglehart and Welzel write: (p 297)

‘Current US policy gives central importance to the war on terrorism. Halting terrorism is a goal shared by most civilised people. The question is, how?’

‘It has often been observed that even in social revolutions precipitated by economic deprivation, the revolutionary activists themselves rarely come from the most deprived strata. Like other activists, they generally come from relatively prosperous families who provided them with the education and resources that enabled them to play activist roles. Terrorists too often emerge from relatively prosperous backgrounds, which has sometimes been interpreted as proving that economic deprivation has nothing to do with terrorism ... to be sure there is no one-to-one relationship but the evidence [examined here] is that there is a strong relationship between existential insecurity and the prevalence of xenophobia, intolerance and extremism in a society [refers to p 81 real GNP/survival values]. Xenophobic terrorist themselves are not usually destitute but they tend to emerge in societies shaped by existential insecurity’.

... ‘If this is true, then the US government’s current war on terrorism is too narrowly conceived to have much chance of success’.

They add:

‘Without question, it is sometimes necessary to use force against terrorists but killing individual terrorists is merely treating the symptoms while ignoring the causes’

Inglehart and Welzel point out that ‘military victory’ in countries like Afghanistan or Iraq was ‘relatively easy - the problem was what came next’. They go on: (pp 297-8)
'Establishing stable democracies was seen as the next step, but this proved to be much more difficult. The facile assumption that democracy is really pretty easy to establish provided a feel-good ideology, but it collided with reality'.

Holding elections, they say, is relatively easy but 'it is not at all easy to establish stable democracy under conditions of severe existential insecurity'.

'Stable and effective democracy generally emerges through a process of human development that starts with economic development, which leads to a culture of tolerance, trust and emphasis on human autonomy. As long as a large share of the public feels that physical survival is insecure, democracy is not likely to flourish'.

...‘The war on terrorism will not be won in any lasting fashion as long as the lives of a large part of the population are shaped by a sense of desperation and an awareness that much of the world is incomparably more prosperous, feeding feelings that the world is unjust and creating conditions under which dangerous extremist demagogues can manipulate people into accepting xenophobic ideologies. ... conditions of frustration and desperation provide fertile ground for extremist ideologies like those of Hitler and bin Laden’.

Inglehart and Welzel’s strategic conclusion is that we should pursue the relief of poverty through socio-economic development. It is they say ‘an attainable goal’.

They note that on ODA or Overseas Development Assistance:

‘the United States has been a striking underachiever in comparison with other developed countries, providing only 0.15% of the US gross national income, far lower than the percentage spent by other OECD countries, which ranges from almost 1 percent provided by Norway, to the one seventh of one percent provided by the United States in 2003’.

This may have something to do with the large percentage of Outer Directed Prospectors in the US, a factor which is not separated out in Inglehart’s model but which shows up in the analysis we made in issue 51 [18] of this Newsletter. Inner Directed Pioneers strongly support values like universalism, benevolence, ethics and have a global outlook. This is much less shared, and in some cases actively opposed, by Prospectors (Outer Directed), as well as most Settlers. So the more Pioneer-ish a country’s population is (which Les Higgins measured in our analysis), the more it is likely to support ODA spending (which we showed is true). Inglehart’s Survival - Self-Expression values axis really only distinguishes the Settler and Pioneer ends of a spectrum, and not the Prospectors in the middle. Some Prospectors (those having achieved the esteem of others) may espouse some of the Self-Expression values he measures, so he may be identifying a mixture of Inner Directed and Outer Directed people as those with high ‘Self-Expression values’.

In any event, it is plain that the US has scope to spend a lot more on ODA if it shifted some resources from, for example, defence ($405 billion) or alcoholic drinks ($60 billion) to boost its $3billion on official development assistance to less-developed countries (p 298).

At a micro military level, this is part of the COIN debate[19]: is the socio-economic aspect being sufficiently resourced? Obviously not.
Conclusions

Elements of the US military and possibly the US political-military complex have embarked on a new strategy of Counterinsurgency, based partly on meeting the Maslowian needs of populations. Inglehart and Welzel have shown that effective democracy, often the avowed objective of foreign military interventions by the US and UK, is the result of the same process of human socio-economic development and emancipation, hinging on meeting psychological needs which in turn change values.

Any execution of the Kilcullen-type COIN strategy poses new immediate challenges for NGOs and the sustainable development community because it dissolves the boundary between warfare and development. If pursued on any scale as a frame for foreign policy however, it potentially opens up resources currently devoted to military weapons spending, for development spending, starting with meeting basic survival needs such as relief from disease and starvation, and working up the Maslow hierarchy.

Peace, conflict resolution and anti-corruption campaigners might also note that if governments such as the US adopted the logic of such a strategy it could lead to the avoidance of conflict in the first place. It is perhaps time that they became acquainted with values analysis if they are not abreast of it already, in order to influence such policies.

What would Abraham Maslow make of all this? I don’t know but he was a man who humanized psychology, and who was concerned to discover why some people were happy and others were not. My guess is that he would have been pleased - if his work could lead to a reduction in one of the greatest sources of misery and unhappiness - war and conflict.

The Kilcullen experiment may not last but the underlying human-development logic, proved by Inglehart and Welzel across many countries and demonstrated at a much more detailed level by CDSM and others, will not go away. The barriers to adopting a needs-based strategy include the opposition of sociologists, anthropologists and other ‘ists who see psychology as a competing discipline; the interest groups who see it as a threat (eg in the case of a COIN application, probably arms manufacturers and conventional warfare advocates); and possibly politicians who fear that they cannot ‘sell it’. Perhaps this last problem may be overcome by Obama. Bush and Blair nailed their colours to the War on Terror, a tough-and-crush frame which they couldn’t escape from and, as I noted out in Newsletter 15, even led Tony Blair to spin away the meaning of his own wife’s comments on Palestine, to avoid appearing ‘weak’.

Maybe now it is possible for politicians to sell the idea that we must understand the causes of terrorism without fearing that Fox News or the Daily Mail will damage them by equating ‘understand’ with ‘sympathise’. Now that the advocates of ‘understanding’ are not politicians who can be accused of appeasement or academic social scientists but Marine Generals and COIN strategists, the messengers are rather more fireproof. American journalist Ambrose Bierce once quipped that “war is God’s way of teaching Americans geography”. Perhaps through the failure of conventional force, terrorism is God’s way of teaching Americans psychology.
Maslow Goes To War: Terrorism, Strategies, Values and Democracy

[8] See the innumerable blogs on Google, many by serving and former military officers, and eg Tom Hicks, Iraq: The Unravelling, 3 30 2009, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/30/iraq_the_unraveling
The Art of Petraeus, T X Hammes http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_98/ai_n31524522/
[14] These do not map straight onto Maslowian needs but broadly speaking, Survival and Traditional values are Security Driven in Maslowian terms, and Self-Expression values are mainly Inner Directed but with some overlap to Outer Directed, and Secular-Rational values will be found in societies beginning to meet Security Driven needs.
[16] ref 15 op cit
[17] They are very fond of the word ‘existential’ which is maybe why their book has not had as much influence as it might - it means the pervading sense of what is around you, your experience of existence.

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